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Abstract
In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed
and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intra-cohort redistribution done by the
following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor's bene¯t provisions, the system
redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households (not necessarily progressive). Retirement
bene¯ts are a concave function of past mean earnings. Hence, the system redistributes from high
earners to low earners. Finally, the existence of a cap on social security taxable earnings makes
the system regressive. This is the ¯rst paper that quanti¯es redistributive, labor supply, and
welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Agents start out
as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage pro¯les, where the latter
depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on the
labor supply of its member(s) and saving. The aggregate production function has as inputs capital
and labor aggregated by e±ciency. Elimination of these policies results in a 6.1% increase in
married female labor force participation rate. The middle-income single-earner married households
experience the largest welfare losses whereas the high-income two-earner households together with
high-income single households experience the largest welfare gains.
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U.S. Social Security System is facing a serious ¯nancial imbalance over the next 75 years.
Projected OASDI tax collections will only be su±cient to ¯nance about 75% of scheduled
annual bene¯t payments in 2037 through 2084 (Board of Trustees Report 2010). In order
to overcome this problem, a number of reform proposals, which include the elimination of
the current pay-as-you-go system, have been widely discussed and studied. A major concern
with the elimination of the current system is the elimination of intra-cohort redistribution
that is due to certain rules of the system. This is the ¯rst paper that quanti¯es welfare and
aggregate consequences of eliminating major redistributive rules of social security using a
general equilibrium model while keeping the pay-as-you-go feature intact.
Currently, workers face a °at payroll tax rate up to a cap level of earnings.1 Monthly
bene¯t entitlement of a retiree, i.e, Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), is a function of average
past earnings. The system is generally thought to be progressive since this function replaces
a larger fraction of past earnings for lower earners than higher earners. However, spousal
and survivor's bene¯t provisions may break this relation between one's past earnings and
retirement income. Current system gives a married retiree the right to collect the higher of
own PIA and ¯fty percent of the spouse's PIA (spousal bene¯t). For instance, a single-earner
married household collects one hundred ¯fty percent of the PIA of the breadwinner per month
upon retirement.2 Moreover, a survivor gets the higher of own PIA and one hundred percent
of the spouse's PIA (survivor's bene¯t). Due to these provisions, the system discourages
labor force participation of secondary earners and redistributes towards all single-earner
married households and to qualifying two-earner households. Since spousal and survivor's
bene¯ts increase with past mean earnings of the primary earner in the household, these
rules are regressive among the recipients of these bene¯ts. Finally, since workers do not
pay payroll taxes for their earnings in excess of the earnings cap, high earners face a lower
marginal (payroll) tax rate than low earners. Hence, the earnings cap is a regressive rule
1 In 2010, the social security tax rate is 12.4% and the earnings cap is $106,800.
2 Indeed, when the spousal bene¯t provision was added to social security law in 1939, one of the explicit
aims was to encourage traditional bread winner-home maker households. See Carlson (2005) for development
of 1939 amendments to social security system.
1of social security. Overall and cross-sectional welfare consequences of these four rules are
unknown and might have crucial implications for policymaking.
Liebman (2002) is the ¯rst paper that attempts to measure the intra-cohort redistribution
due to the rules of social security. It is a microsimulation exercise that is able to capture
all of the heterogeneity present in the data. However, this study fails to account for the
behavioral and general equilibrium implications of counter-factual changes in social security
rules. Moreover, it is silent about welfare e®ects of such changes. As I discuss below,
eliminating these rules have signi¯cant implications on saving and labor supply decisions of
households as well as their welfare.
With these considerations in mind, I build and calibrate a general equilibrium overlapping
generations model with capital and heterogenous agents. Agents start out as married or
single, and their marital status do not change over the life-cycle. After retirement, each
agent faces a gender and age dependent mortality risk. Agents have certain education
levels and wage pro¯les, where the latter depend on agents' education and gender. The
household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving.
The labor supply decision of a married household is a joint decision and involves a labor
market participation decision for the female. The households with two earners incur an
additional ¯xed utility cost, where the costs di®er across households. Besides income and
capital taxes, workers pay social security taxes. As in the current system, PIA of a retiree is
determined by a piecewise-linear concave function. Qualifying married households receive
spousal bene¯t provision, whereas qualifying survivors receive survival bene¯t provision.
The calibrated model economy closely resembles features of the 2000 U.S. economy. The
benchmark economy is consistent with observations on gender wage gap, wage premia and
married female labor force participation across education groups, and the structure of marital
sorting. The structure of taxation closely resembles the income taxes paid in 2000.
I ¯nd that eliminating all four policies have signi¯cant consequences. In the new steady
state, poorer married households experience losses in retirement incomes (as high as 21%),
whereas richer ones experience rises in retirement incomes (as high as 25%). Households
respond to the elimination of these policies by changing their saving and labor supply deci-
sions. Aggregate married female labor force participation rate increases by 6.1%. Changes
in output, capital stock, and labor supply are relatively smaller: 0.5%, 0.2%, and 0.7%,
2respectively. Aggregate welfare goes up by 0.6%, while more than 74% of households gain.
Married households with relatively low earner females experience welfare losses (as high as
1.1%), whereas the ones with high earner females experience welfare gains (as high as 2.2%).
Contrary to common opinion, the households who are mostly hurt from the elimination of
these policies are not the poorest households. The middle-income households where the
males are high earners (more than college education) and the females are low earners (less
than high school education) experience the largest losses in welfare. On the other hand,
single males with more than college education gain about 3.2%, whereas single females with
less than high school education lose about 1.1% in welfare.
Eliminating spousal and survivor's bene¯ts alone increases female labor force partici-
pation by 5.2% as opportunity cost of staying out of the market increases. Single-earner
married households, and the two-earner households where females have signi¯cantly lower
earnings than males experience losses in retirement incomes (as high as 23.6%). As a result
a signi¯cant number of females in these households start participating in the labor market
(the rise is as high as 11.2%). Such households incur welfare losses (as high as 1.1%),
whereas through the general equilibrium channel the households who don't collect these
bene¯ts experience sizeable welfare gains (as high as 1.7%).
When progressivity of bene¯t calculation alone is eliminated, the biggest winners are
not the richest households. The elimination of progressivity increases (decreases) bene¯ts
of high earners (low earners). Since spousal and survivor's bene¯ts are proportional to
the bene¯ts of the primary earner in the household, when the bene¯ts of the primary earner
increases, value of spousal and survivor's bene¯ts increases at the same rate. As a result, the
elimination of progressivity of bene¯t calculation bene¯ts mostly the households with very
high earning husbands (more than college education) and very low earning wives (less than
high school education). Welfare of these households increase by about 2%. On the other
hand, when progressivity and spousal&survivor's bene¯ts are eliminated together, richest
married households experience the largest welfare gains of 2.1%, whereas the poorer ones
experience a welfare loss of 1%.
Elimination of the earnings cap mostly a®ects households with high earning members.
Due to a higher marginal tax rate, married male workers with more than college education
decrease their hours on average by 3%, whereas their wives, who are workers, increase their
3hours by about 1% (intra-household substitution of labor). Such households experience
welfare losses (as high as 0.5%).
Related Literature { This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, it
builds on papers that analyze aggregate and cross-sectional implications of various reforms
to the current pay-as-you-go social security system. Recent contributors include Auerbach
and Kotliko® (1987), _ Imrohoro¸ glu, _ Imrohoro¸ glu and Joines (1995), Kotliko®, Smetters and
Walliser (1998a), Huggett and Ventura (1999), Conesa and Kruger (1999), Fuster (1999),
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), Gustman and Stein-
meier (2004), Fuster, _ Imrohoro¸ glu and _ Imrohoro¸ glu (2007), and Huggett and Parra (2010).
Second, it is related to papers that analyze macroeconomic implications of the participation
(extensive) margin. Cho and Rogerson (1988), Cho and Cooley (1994), Mulligan (2001) and
Chang and Kim (2006), among others, are examples of the papers in this group. As Roger-
son and Wallenius (2009), Kaygusuz (2010), Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (forthcoming),
Sanchez-Martin and Marcos (2010) and this paper di®ers from the others by analyzing the
role of the extensive margin for public policy.
Recently, Nishiyama (2010) studies implications of eliminating spousal and survivor's
bene¯t provisions using a general equilibrium model with uninsurable wage shocks. Main
di®erences between this paper and Nishiyama (2010) are: i) it does not model female labor
force participation explicitly (he assumes all agents are workers), ii) it does not study impli-
cations of progressivity of bene¯t calculations and earnings cap and hence does not evaluate
all redistributive aspects of social security, iii) it only considers married households and
therefore overestimates the general equilibrium consequences of eliminating the provisions.
Blau (1997) also investigates the e®ects of the spousal bene¯t provision on labor force par-
ticipation of married women.3 In order to overcome estimation problems, he assumes away
households' saving decisions and labor supply decisions along hours margin, the progressive
calculation of bene¯ts and general equilibrium implications of eliminating the provision.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details speci¯cs of the model. Section
3 describes the parameterization of the benchmark economy. Section 4 has a detailed
description of the reforms that I study together with the ¯ndings. Section 5 concludes.
3 See also Gustman and Steinmeier (2004), Blau (1998), and Blau(1998).
42 A Life-Cycle Model with Two-Earner Households
In this section I lay out the details of a stationary general equilibrium life-cycle model
populated with single and married households.
Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations that consists of a continuum of
males and a continuum of females. Every period a new generation of individuals is born.
The population growth rate is given with n. Agents in this economy live at most J periods.
They begin life as workers and retire after the mandatory retirement age jR.4 Starting
with the last period of working life, an agent faces a positive mortality risk at the end of each
period. In particular a person with gender i; with i 2 fm;fg; faces a survival probability of
½ij from age j to age j +1. Each agent enters economic life as married or single. I assume
that a constant fraction Á of the newborns are married and the rest are single. There is no
divorce or marriage over the life-cycle. Note that, since the survival probability is gender
dependent, spouses can possibly die at di®erent ages. Moreover, due to the assumption on
the values of the survival probability (½ij = 1 for j < jR), a survivor also is a retiree.
Productive Heterogeneity
Workers di®er by their market productivity levels. The productivity of a worker, ei(z;j),
depends on the agent's intrinsic skill type z, age j; and gender i. Skill type z comes from
a ¯nite set Z = fz1;z2;:::g. I assume that each agent is born with a particular skill type
that does not change over the life-cycle. Moreover, there is no uncertainty about a worker's
future productivity.
When z is the skill type of the wife and ~ z is the skill type of the husband, M(z; ~ z)
denotes the distribution married households by skill types of the spouses. Similarly, Si(z)
denotes the distribution of gender-i single households by skill type. Finally, let ­(z) and
ª(z) denote the distributions of males and females by their types, respectively.5
Preferences
In this economy agents value consumption and dislike labor. The utility function for a
4 Retirement in this paper is the age at which the agents start collecting retirement income. Agents can
always choose not to work at, or before age jR.
5 As can be seen from the choice of the notation, I assume that these skill distributions are age invariant.
5single person is given with
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where c is consumption, l is labor, ° is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and µ > 0 is
taste parameter for labor. On the other hand, a married household's utility function is
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c is consumption, and li, i 2 fm;fg, is labor supply. q stands for per period utility cost
of joint-work. Â(lf) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the female supplies
a positive amount of labor. I assume that husbands who are not retired always work, but
wives may choose to stay out of the labor force. Following Cho and Rogerson (1988), I
assume that if a wife participates in the labor market then her household incurs a utility
cost of q 2 R+.6 The household draws its utility cost at age 1 from a distribution ©() that
depends on the skill of the husband. Finally, I assume that q is constant over the life-cycle.
Income
Labor earnings, capital income, and retirement bene¯ts are the sources of income. The
agents participate in a competitive labor market where w is the wage rate per e±ciency unit
of labor. Households can save in the form of a risk-free asset and earn a competitive rental
rate r: Moreover, I assume that they are born with no assets and are not allowed to borrow.
Asset holdings of a deceased household are not rebated back to the agents who are alive
(i.e., no bequests). I focus on a steady state equilibrium at which w and r are constant over
time.
A j-year old married household (j · jR) earns ef(z;j)lfw + em(~ z;j)lmw if the spouses
work lf and lm hours in the market. Moreover, if the household's asset holdings is a units,
then the total household income is ef(z;j)lfw +em(~ z;j)lmw + ra. Similarly, income of a
j-year old single agent is the sum of labor earnings, ei(z;j)liw, and interest income, ra.
Income of a retired household is the sum of retirement bene¯t payments and interest
income. Below, I describe the social security system in more detail.
6 The utility cost can be interpreted as utility loss due to inconvenience for scheduling and/or less family
time with children.
6Social Security
There is a pay-as-you-go social security system that taxes labor earnings and uses all of
the proceeds to pay for the retirement bene¯ts.
Taxable earnings for social security purposes consists only of labor earnings up to Emax >
0. For earnings below this cap, a worker faces a proportional social security tax rate ¿p.




Henceforth, I will refer to minfei(z;j)liw;Emaxg as social security taxable earnings of an
agent.
The bene¯t that an agent is entitled to, B(¹ ei), depends on the average of her/his past
social security taxable labor earnings, ¹ ei.
B(¹ ei) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
»1¹ ei
»1·1 + »2(¹ ei ¡ ·1)
»1·1 + »2(·2 ¡ ·1) + »3(¹ ei ¡ ·2)
if ¹ ei · ·1
if ·2 ¸ ¹ ei ¸ ·1
if ¹ ei ¸ ·2
(3)
»1; »2 and »3 are all between 0 and 1. This particular functional form is the one that is






A single household collects her/his entitlement as the social security bene¯t payment.
On the other hand, a married household is treated di®erently. In principle the household
can receive a retirement bene¯t that is di®erent than the sum of the entitlements of the
spouses. The system gives a married person the right to collect the higher of own bene¯t
entitlement and half of the spouse's entitlement. If the person collects the latter she/he is
said to collect the spousal bene¯t. The total bene¯t payments that the married household
receives is given as
H(¹ ef; ¹ em) = maxfB(¹ em) + B(¹ ef);B(¹ em) +
1
2




7 See http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2000/apnd.pdf for details.
7A survivor also can collect a retirement bene¯t that is di®erent than his/her entitlement.
The system gives a survivor the right to collect the higher of his/her entitlement and the
full amount of the deceased spouse's entitlement. If the agent collects the latter she/he is
said to collect the survivor's bene¯t. The total bene¯t collection of the survivor can be
summarized as
D(¹ ef; ¹ em) = maxfB(¹ em);B(¹ ef)g:
Income Taxation
Households pay income tax and capital income tax. Income tax that a household pays
depends on the household's taxable income and marital status. The taxable income is sum
of the labor earnings and the capital income. For simplicity, I assume that bene¯t payments
are exempt from income taxation. Income tax functions for married and single households
are denoted by T M(:) and T S(:), respectively.
In this economy capital income is subject to double taxation.8 Besides income taxes,
households pay an additional tax for their capital incomes at a proportional rate ¿k.
Technology
There is a single representative ¯rm in the economy which hires capital and labor. Let
K denote the aggregate capital and L denote the aggregate labor in e±ciency units. The




where ® 2 (0;1) is the output share of capital. The capital depreciates at a constant rate
± 2 (0;1).
2.1 Households' Decision Problem
In this section I describe the problem of the households in the economy. Worker households
choose asset holdings and labor supply of the members, whereas retirees only choose the
asset holdings. I present the problems of households in a recursive way as follows.
Single Households
8 Additional capital income taxation exists in order to capture the corporate income taxes paid.
8Consider the problem of a j-year old, gender-i; single worker (j · jR). The agent has
a skill type z and a units of the asset at the beginning of the current period. Finally, the
household observes his/her past mean earnings, ¹ e, before making any decisions.9 The














0 = ei(z;j)wl + (1 + r)a ¡ T
p(ei(z;j)wl) ¡ T




(j ¡ 1)¹ e + minfei(z;j)lw;Emaxg
j
;
where ¯ > 0 is the discount factor. Recall that the survival probability, ½ij, takes values
less than 1 for j ¸ jR. Finally, the last equation describes the law of motion for past mean
social security taxable earnings.













0 = (1 + r)a + B(¹ e) ¡ T
S(ra) ¡ ¿
kra:
As can be seen from the statement of the problem, ¹ e for a retiree does not change. It only
changes for workers.
Married Households
Consider the problem of a j-year old married household with j · jR. The wife has a
skill type z; and the husband has a skill type ~ z. The household holds a units of the asset.
Recall that q denotes the utility cost of joint work for the household. Before taking any
decisions on current consumption (c), labor supply of the husband (lm), labor supply of the
wife (lf), and future asset holdings (a0), the household observes the past mean earnings of
9 One should note that a new born begins life with zero asset holdings and zero past mean earnings.
9the husband and the wife (¹ em and ¹ ef). The problem of the household can be written as
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(j ¡ 1)¹ ei + minfei(z;j)lw;Emaxg
j
;i 2 fm;fg:
SV Rij() denotes the value function for a j¡year old survivor of gender i: The husband
becomes a survivor with probability ½mj(1 ¡ ½fj), whereas the wife becomes one with prob-
ability ½fj(1 ¡ ½mj). The last equation describes the law of motion for past mean social
security taxable earnings of each spouse.
Next, consider the problem of a j-year old retired couple. Only choice variable for the
household is the asset holdings for future.
V
M






0; ¹ em; ¹ ef)
+ ½mj(1 ¡ ½fj)SV Rmj+1(~ z;q;a
0; ¹ em; ¹ ef)
+ ½fj(1 ¡ ½mj)SV Rfj+1(z;q;a
0; ¹ em; ¹ ef)]
subject to
c + a
0 = (1 + r)a ¡ ¿
kra + H(¹ ef; ¹ em) ¡ T
M(ra);
where H() is the bene¯t payment that the household receives (equation 5).
Survivors
Finally consider the problem of a j-year old survivor with a units of asset holdings.
10SV Rij(z;q;a; ¹ em; ¹ ef) = max
a0¸0
U
S(c;0) + ¯½ijSV Rij(z;q;a
0; ¹ em; ¹ ef)
subject to
c + a
0 = (1 + r)a + D(¹ ef; ¹ em) ¡ ¿
kra ¡ T
M(ra)
where D(¹ ef; ¹ em) is the retirement bene¯t of the survivor.
3 Parameter Values
In this section I summarize the calibration strategy and discuss parameter values that I use
to simulate the model economies.
Demographics
The model economy is calibrated to the U.S. economy in 2000. U.S. Census data are
used unless stated otherwise.10 Length of a period is set to be 10 years. Age 1 in the
model corresponds to ages between 25 and 34. Agents live at most 7 periods (J = 7) and
retire after age 4 (jR = 4). Since all agents die at the end of ¯nal period, the probability
of survival to the 8th period is set as 0 (½i7 = 0). Recall that agents in the model face
mortality risk only at or after age jR. Hence, ½ij is 1 for all j < jR for i 2 fm;fg. The
remaining survival probabilities, which are reported in Table 1, are constructed using data
from Social Security Administration's publication. The population rate, n, is consistent
with the long-run average of U.S. population growth rate (see Table 7). As a result, the
fraction of retirees in the model economy at any given date is about 18:9%, whereas it is
19:2% in the data.11 Since 74 percent of people between ages 25 and 64 are married in the
data, Á is chosen to be 0:74.
Skills and Endowments
I assume that a skill type is represented by education in the data. Moreover, I assume
¯ve skill types corresponding to the educational attainment levels de¯ned in Table 2.
10 Source: Census data tabulated by IPUMS-USA, Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota
(www.ipums.org).
11 In particular, 19.2% of all of the individuals older than 25 years of age are the ones who are older than
65 in the 2000 U.S. data.
11Table 1: Survival Probability Values
Females Males
½f4 = 0:818 ½m4 = 0:728
½f5 = 0:592 ½m5 = 0:456
½f6 = 0:206 ½m6 = 0:122
Table 2: Classi¯cation of Skill Types
Skill Type Educational Attainment
<hs less than high school degree
hs high school diploma
sc less than 4 years of college education
col college degree
col+ post college education
In order to construct the distributions of households by education, I consider the sample
between ages 25 and 64. First, I ¯nd the distribution of married households by education of
the spouses (as shown in Table 3). One can observe the well known fact about assortative
mating from this table. Spouses in most married households have similar educational
attainment levels.12 Next, I ¯nd the distribution of males by education and the distribution
of females by education independent of marital status (­(z) and ª(z)). Using the following
accounting identities, I construct the distribution of gender-i single households by education
(reported in Table 4).








Next, I describe how I calibrate the market productivity levels for each skill type and
gender. I consider again the individuals who are older than 25 and younger than 64. I
exclude those who are not full-time workers or are self-employed or are unpaid workers or
12 The level of marital sorting by education has been quite high and constant from 1940 until 1980s, but
has increased since then. See Mare and Schwartz (2005) for changes in assortative mating by education from
1940 to 2003.
12Table 3: Distribution of Married Households by Education
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+ Total
<hs 6.93 4.26 2.33 0.39 0.17 14.09
hs 3.27 13.49 7.32 1.82 0.65 26.54
sc 1.8 7.47 13.61 4.3 1.52 28.71
col 0.39 2.35 5.73 7.52 2.56 18.55
col+ 0.17 0.87 2.57 4.33 4.17 12.11
Total 12.56 28.44 31.56 18.36 9.07 100







earn less than half of the minimum wage per hour.13 I divide the sample into subgroups
by age, gender and skill type of individuals. First, I ¯nd average weekly wages by dividing
total annual wage and salary income to total weeks worked for each subgroup. Then, I
normalize them with the mean weekly wage for the entire sample to ¯nd the relative market
productivity levels. Table 5 reports these productivity values.
Two features of this table are worth noting. First, as documented in Olivetti (2006),
age-earning pro¯les for females are much °atter than the ones for males. Second, as Eckstein
and Nagyp¶ al (2004) document, there are signi¯cant di®erences between earnings of people
with post-college education and college education.
Production Technology
There are 2 parameters to be determined on the production side of the model. I set
the capital share ® to be 0.343 and the depreciation rate ± to be 0.432 (annualized value
is 0.055) (see Table 7). These values are consistent with a notion of capital that includes
¯xed private capital, land, inventories, and consumer durables. Altogether, this implies an
13 These restrictions are in line with the ones in Katz and Murphy (1992).
13Table 5: Productivity Values by Types, by Gender
Males
Skill
Age <hs hs sc col col+
1 0.536 0.754 0.867 1.182 1.509
2 0.635 0.896 1.097 1.550 1.988
3 0.666 0.955 1.174 1.646 2.061
4 0.729 0.958 1.209 1.705 2.294
Females
Skill
<hs hs sc col col+
0.449 0.551 0.652 0.928 1.220
0.419 0.621 0.774 1.051 1.438
0.449 0.642 0.788 1.066 1.372
0.529 0.620 0.815 1.140 1.364
annual capital to output ratio of about 2.93.14
Social Security System
As described in Equation 3, monthly bene¯t entitlement in the law is calculated with a
progressive formula. As the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) of a retiree increases,
the marginal bene¯t entitlement decreases. In 2000, ¯rst $531 of AIME is multiplied with
0.90. If applicable, next $2671 of AIME is multiplied with 0.32. Finally, the part of
AIME that exceeds $3202 is multiplied with 0.15. Accordingly, I set »1 = 0:90; »2 = 0:32;
and »3 = 0:15 (see Equation 3). Next, I multiply the bend points in the law with 12 and
then normalize them with mean household income of U.S. in 2000.15 For benchmark
calculations, I multiply these normalized numbers with the mean household income in the
benchmark model to determine the bend points. The values of ·1 and ·2 that I use in the
benchmark model are reported in Table 7.
Maximum taxable labor earnings for social security purposes in 2000 is $76,200. In line
with the previous calibration strategy, I normalize this cap with mean household income
for 2000. Again, I multiply this normalized number with the mean household income that
comes out of the model in order to parameterize Emax. Finally, the social security tax rate,
¿p = 0:098, is the one that balances the social security budget (see Table 7).
Income Tax and Capital Income Tax
In order to better re°ect the actual taxes paid as a function of income, I estimate e®ective
taxes paid as a function of reported income and marital status. The 2000 data from Internal
Revenue Service is used for these purposes. For married households, I consider married
14 See Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (forthcoming) for details.
15 Mean household income in 2000 is $57,135 (from Census).
14households ¯ling jointly, and for single households, I consider single households legal category.
I follow Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (forthcoming) in the estimation of the e®ective
functions. Total income tax paid, total income, total number of returns, and total number of
taxable returns are available for certain income brackets. Using this data I ¯nd the average
tax rate as
average tax rate =
f
total income tax paid




I also normalize average incomes with mean household income of 2000. Then, I estimate the
relationship between these normalized income levels and average tax rates. This procedure
is similar to the one in Gouveia and Strauss (1994). In particular, I estimate the following
tax functions for married and single households:
T
M(I) = [0:104 + 0:075log(I)]I;
and
T
S(I) = [0:154 + 0:059log(I)]I
where I is the normalized income. Marginal tax rates derived from these tax functions are
shown in Figure 2.
Finally, I estimate the capital income tax rate to proxy the corporate income tax pay-
ments. Between 1987 and 2000, corporate income tax revenue was approximately 1.92
percent of GDP. Given my assumption about the production technology, a 9.7 percent
capital income tax rate replicates this share.
Preference Parameters
There are three preference parameters to be set. These are µ, ° and ¯. The choice of
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, °; is based on available estimates. For married women,
Blundell & MaCurdy (1999) reports a range of estimates from 0.5 to 1, for males, MaCurdy
(1981) ¯nds a range from 0.10 to 0.40 and Altonji (1986) ¯nds a range from 0 to 0.35. I
assume that ° = 0:4.
Given the values of other parameters, the choice of labor parameter, µ, targets the hours
worked per worker in the 2000 U.S. Census data. A worker on average spends about 40.1%
15of his/her available time for labor.16 Finally, the discount factor ¯ results in a steady-state
capital to output ratio that is consistent with the data (see Table 7).
Following Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (forthcoming), I assume that the utility cost
of joint work, q, is distributed according to (°exible) gamma distribution with parameters









where z is the type of the husband, and ¡() is the Gamma function.
Using Census data, I calculate the employment-population ratio of married females be-
tween ages 25 and 54 for each of the educational categories de¯ned earlier.17 Table 6 shows
the participation rates of married females by types of households for 2000 U.S. economy.
The aggregate labor force participation is 69.3%. The choice of ¸z and ¹z reproduces the
participation rates of women who are married to type¡z men as close as possible. For
instance, the benchmark values of ¸ and ¹ for high school graduate men imply participation
rates that are consistent with the ones reported in the second row of Table 6. As discussed
in Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (forthcoming), this calibration strategy allows us to ex-
ploit the information contained in the di®erences in the labor force participation of married
females as their own wage di®er by education. Hence, we get the slope of the distribution
of q as in the data, which might be crucial for the quantitative implications of this paper.
Table 6: Labor Force Participation of Married Women, Census 2000, (%)
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 41.2 62 71.5 77.4 69.2
hs 49.6 67.4 77.2 83.7 85.5
sc 50.1 67.9 74.8 82.9 88.4
col 49.1 63.6 68.7 73.2 83.2
col+ 43.6 57.3 62.1 63.5 78.7
16 I consider people who are between 25 and 54. On average a person works about 2005 hours annually.
I assume that 5000 hours is the total amount of time available for work per year.
17 I consider all individuals who are not in the armed forces.
16Table 7: Parameter Values
° 0.4





·1 0.112 of mean income
·2 0.673 of mean income







I evaluate 5 alternative economies in order to quantify the implications of spousal and
survivor's bene¯t provisions, progressive calculation of bene¯ts, and cap on social security
taxable earnings. Note that in all of the alternative economies the pay-as-you-go structure
is kept intact.
In Economy I, only spousal and survivor's bene¯t provisions are absent. In Economy II,
only porgressivity of bene¯t calculation is eliminated. In Economy III, spousal and survivor's
bene¯ts and progressive calculation are eliminated at the same time. In Economy IV, only
cap on earnings is eliminated, and ¯nally in Economy V, all policies are eliminated.
4.1 Economy 1: Eliminating the Spousal & Survivor's Bene¯ts
In this alternative economy married households are not treated favorably: spousal and sur-
vivor's bene¯t provisions are eliminated. Everyone in the economy receives his/her own
entitlement as retirement bene¯t. The social security tax rate is the one in the benchmark
economy (¿p = 9:8%). In order to balance the social security budget the bene¯t entitlement
of each individual is increased by 11%.
Implications of eliminating the provisions on aggregate variables are shown in Table 8.
17In the new steady state, output is 1.1% larger. Hours per worker for both males and females
are almost una®ected. The striking observation is that female labor force participation rate
increases by 5.2% even though the wage rate increases only by 0.3%. The decline in social
security incomes of some married individuals results in a 1.8% rise in capital stock, which is
coupled with a 0.8% rise in aggregate labor in e±ciency units.
Table 8: Economy 1 vs. Benchmark, Aggregates
% change
Hours per Worker (males) ¡0:2
Hours per Worker (females) ¡0:3





Note: Entries show the percentage change in aggregate
variables when spousal & survivor's bene¯ts are eliminated.
As Table 9 shows, the elimination of the provisions have stronger implications on many
types of households. Panel A in the table shows the percentage change in aggregate retire-
ment bene¯ts by types of married households.18 The households with relatively low skilled
wives and high skilled husbands experience signi¯cant losses in the bene¯ts collected after
the provisions are eliminated. Note that this is the group of households for which the fe-
male labor force participation rate is low in the benchmark economy. As Panel B shows the
participation rate for these females increases as much as 11.2%. After losing the provisions,
opportunity cost of staying at home increases for many married females. The cost increases
more for those who are married to high skilled men as the spousal and survivor's bene¯ts
increase with the wage (skill) of the husband. As a result, a larger fraction of such females
become workers and increase their savings to compensate for their losses in their retirement
incomes.
18 A survivor's bene¯t collection is also reported in this panel. For instance, bene¯ts of a col+ type female
survivor with a col+ type deceased husband are counted among the (col+,col+) type married houesholds.
18Table 9: Economy 1 vs. Benchmark, Cross-Sectional E®ects
Panel A
% Change in Bene¯ts
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -0.2 3.0 6.8 6.9 5.3
hs -8.0 -3.1 3.9 7.8 7.4
sc -12.4 -7.6 -2.3 7.6 9.7
col -20.8 -14.8 -10.9 -1.7 4.6
col+ -23.6 -19.6 -15.3 -6.5 0.2
Panel B
% Change in LFP
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 8.0 5.9 2.3 -0.5 -0.4
hs 9.4 6.5 5.0 1.1 -0.2
sc 8.8 6.1 4.7 3.0 0.9
col 7.6 8.4 6.5 3.9 2.5
col+ 11.2 9.7 8.5 5.4 3.2
Panel C
% Change in Welfare
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 1.6 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.6
hs 0.8 1.2 1.6 1.3 0.9
sc 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.4
col -0.9 -0.2 0.2 1.0 1.4








Note: Entries show cross-sectional implications of eliminating the spousal and survivor's bene¯ts.
Panel C reports the steady-state welfare implications of the spousal and survivors' ben-
e¯ts.19 The numbers in the panel show the percentage change in per period consumption
that is needed to make a household living in the benchmark economy as well-o® as in the
new economy. Even though the majority of households gain from the elimination of the
provisions, some married households incur welfare losses. The reason why there are losers is
trivial: some households do not collect the provisions anymore. On the other hand, since the
equilibrium bene¯t payments are larger, there are positive welfare e®ects on most two-earner
married households and all single households. The welfare gains are as high as 1.7% and the
welfare losses are as big as 1.1%. Due to higher retirement incomes, the singles experience
19 In all of the counter-factual excercises I compare steady-states. Computation of transition has been
standard in this litetature. Given the heterogeneity in the paper there is a high computational burden of
computing the transition.
19about a 1.3% welfare gain.
These ¯ndings suggest that spousal and survivor's bene¯ts have a signi¯cant redistribu-
tive role together with signi¯cant welfare implications. The redistribution is from most
two-earner households (the ones with high earning women) and singles to single-earner mar-
ried households and two-earner households with high earning men and low earning women.
Moreover, these provisions discourage a sizeable fraction of married females from labor force
participation.
4.2 Economy 2: Removing the Progressivity of the Bene¯t Cal-
culation
In the second alternative economy, the progressive bene¯t calculation formula (Equation 3)
is replaced with
B(¹ ei) = 0:388¹ ei:
The social security tax rate in the benchmark economy is unchanged (¿p = 9:8%), and the
slope of the new bene¯t function balances the social security budget. All other features of
the social security in the benchmark economy (spousal bene¯t etc.) are kept intact. Figure
1 illustrates the two bene¯t functions. All else equal, with the new bene¯t function, the
retirees with relatively low amount of past mean earnings get lower income, whereas the
ones with relatively high past mean earnings get higher income.
Table 10 reports the aggregate di®erences between the benchmark economy and Econ-
omy 2. Output declines by about 0.7%, whereas the aggregate capital stock declines by
1.6%. Once again, the equilibrium wage rate does not change much. The female labor
force participation rate decreases by 1.1%. As the table shows, aggregate implications of
removing progressivity of bene¯t calculations are not large. However, as I discuss below,
such a change has very signi¯cant implications for many households.
Panel A in Table 11 shows the percentage change in aggregate bene¯t collections of
married households by skill types. The pattern one gets out of this table is that married
households with high skilled men get signi¯cantly higher retirement income, whereas the
ones with low skilled men and low skilled women get signi¯cantly lower retirement income.
The latter observation is not unexpected because this exercise eliminates the progressive
20Table 10: Economy 2 vs. Benchmark, Aggregates
% change
Hours per Worker (males) 0.2
Hours per Worker (females) 0.3





Note: Entries show the percentage change in aggregate variables
when progressivity of bene¯t calculation is eliminated.
feature of social security. For households with high skilled husbands and low skilled wives,
i.e. the middle income households, the big rise in retirement income might look puzzling.
This follows from the fact that most of these households collect the spousal and survivor's
bene¯ts. Therefore, the bene¯t collection of the entire household increases at the rate of
the husband's bene¯t entitlement (which is large due to the elimination of progressivity).
This exercise clearly demonstrates the fact that the spousal bene¯t provision redistributes
mostly from two-earner households to single-earner married households. Moreover, as the
progressivity of the bene¯t calculation is reduced we observe more of such redistribution.
A further observation is that the elimination of the progressivity increases the gap be-
tween the wives' and husbands' bene¯t entitlements for households where the husbands are
more productive (see Figure 1). As a result, more females are discouraged from labor force
participation as the spousal and survivor's bene¯ts become more appealing. Panel B of
Table 11 reports the resulting changes in the participation rates of married women.
Finally, Panel C reports the steady state welfare comparison of Economy 2 with the
benchmark economy. The ¯rst table shows that the elimination of the progressivity of
bene¯t calculation clearly favors the middle income married households. Such households'
welfare are up by as high as 2%, whereas the poorest married households experience a 2%
decline in their welfare. Single women with low skills experience a 2.5% decline in welfare,
whereas high skilled single men experience a 1.4% improvement in their welfare.
This exercise demonstrates that progressive bene¯t calculation is not so progressive when
21Table 11: Economy 2 vs. Benchmark, Cross-Sectional E®ects
Panel A
% Change in Bene¯ts
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -20.7 -20.9 -17.7 -8.8 3.7
hs -8.0 -10.4 -10.7 -8.3 2.3
sc 3.1 0.3 -3.0 -6.2 3.0
col 25.2 23.8 20.6 13.4 14.8
col+ 36.4 36.4 36.4 31.9 29.3
Panel B
% Change in LFP
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 0.3 0.9 2.5 2.6 4.5
hs -1.9 -1.7 -0.5 0.7 2.1
sc -1.4 -1.9 -1.8 -0.5 -0.6
col -1.9 -1.6 -2.4 -1.9 -1.2
col+ -1 -0.9 -0.9 -1.9 -0.2
Panel C
% Change in Welfare
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -2 -1.6 -1.1 -0.4 0.9
hs -1 -1.2 -1.2 -0.8 0.2
sc -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.1
col 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.3








Note: Entries show cross-sectional implications of eliminating the progressivity of bene¯t
calculation.
the spousal and survivor's bene¯ts are present. The degree of progressivity critically af-
fects the number of spousal and survivor's bene¯t recipients. The removal of progressivity
of bene¯t calculation hurts poor households, which is expected, however, bene¯ts mostly
the middle income single-earner married households. Moreover, the elimination discour-
ages more married women from market participation through the disincentives provided by
spousal and survivor's bene¯ts.
224.3 Economy 3: Eliminating the Spousal and Survivors' Bene¯ts
together with the Progressivity of the Bene¯t Calculation
In the new alternative economy, spousal and survivor's bene¯ts are eliminated in conjunction
with the progressivity of bene¯t calculation. The social security tax rate is the one in the
benchmark economy (¿p = 9:8%), whereas the bene¯t function is
B(¹ ei) = 0:449¹ ei;
where the slope, 0:449, balances the social security budget. Note that social security system
in this economy is more generous than the one in Economy 2.
Table 12 shows the percentage di®erences in the aggregate variables relative to the bench-
mark economy. Labor force participation of married women is higher by 6.1%. The hours
of male and female workers are slightly lower. A 1.7% larger capital stock and a 1% larger
labor supply is accompanied with a 1.2% higher output.
Table 12: Economy 3 vs. Benchmark, Aggregates
% change
Hours per Worker (males) -0.2
Hours per Worker (females) -0.3





Note: Entries show the percentage change in aggregate
variables when spousal & survivor's bene¯ts and
progressivity of calculation bene¯ts are eliminated.
Since now the spousal and survivors' bene¯ts also are eliminated, we should expect
a redistribution from poorer households to richer households through the elimination of
progressivity of bene¯t calculation. Panels A and C in Table 13 con¯rm this expectation.
Low skilled married households get signi¯cantly lower retirement incomes, whereas the high
skilled ones get signi¯cantly higher retirement incomes. The elimination of spousal and
survivor's bene¯ts strengthens the implications of the elimination of the progressivity. This
23follows from the fact that poorer married households are mostly single-earners and therefore
are the recipients of the spousal bene¯t. As a result, female labor force participation
increases signi¯cantly. As Panel B illustrates, the labor supply response of low skilled females
is stronger. Panel C of the same table shows the welfare implications. In contrast to the
previous exercise, among married households the biggest winners are richer ones, whereas
the poor married households again incur welfare losses. Note that the biggest winners in the
previous exercise, the married households with high skilled husbands and low skilled wives,
now experience a welfare loss close to 1% upon losing spousal and survivor bene¯ts. On
the other hand, col+ single males experience the largest welfare gains of 3.1%.
Table 13: Economy 3 vs. Benchmark, Cross Sectional E®ects
Panel A
% Change in Bene¯ts
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -23.3 -18.3 -9.9 -2.4 5.7
hs -21.9 -16.1 -7.8 1.0 14.2
sc -17.8 -11.5 -7.9 4.9 14.2
col -10.1 -4.6 -1.5 8.2 21.1
col+ -5.8 -1.7 3.1 13.1 23.5
Panel B
% Change in LFP
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 10.5 9.7 5.3 2.2 3.2
hs 9.2 8.2 6.8 2.5 2
sc 7.7 6.5 5.2 3.8 2.5
col 5 7.7 6.3 4.2 3.4
col+ 8.3 8.7 8.3 6 4.3
Panel C
% Change In Welfare
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -0.7 0.0 0.6 0.6 1.2
hs -1 -0.1 0.7 0.9 1.3
sc -1.1 -0.5 0.2 1.2 1.6
col -1.1 -0.3 0.1 1.1 1.8








Note: Entries show cross-sectional implications of eliminating spousal and survivor's bene¯ts and
progressivity of bene¯t calculation.
244.4 Economy 4: Eliminating the Cap on Earnings
The cap on social security taxable earnings is eliminated while all other redistributive policies
are kept intact in Economy 4. The social security tax rate is the one in the benchmark
economy (¿p = 9:8%). In order to balance the budget, I scale up the bene¯t entitlements
of each agent (given with Equation 3) by 1%. In contrast to the benchmark economy, the
workers who earn in excess of the cap level of earnings now face a higher marginal tax rate,
however, in return get a higher retirement bene¯t. Note that past mean earnings are no
longer bounded by the earnings cap, hence, there is no longer a cap on bene¯t entitlements.20
Aggregate di®erences between the current economy and the benchmark economy are
reported in Table 14. The di®erences in the aggregate variables are not large. One
important observation is that the hours of female workers slightly increase and the hours
of male workers slightly decrease. This exercise increases the marginal tax rates for very
productive workers. Therefore, one expects this group to be a®ected directly. For this
reason, below I discuss the changes in working hours of di®erent individuals instead of the
participation rates of females.
Table 14: Economy 4 vs. Benchmark, Aggregates
% change
Hours per Worker (males) -0.2
Hours per Worker (females) 0.3





Note: Entries show the percentage change in aggregate variables
when cap on social security taxable earnings is eliminated.
Panel A in Table 15 shows how the labor hours of workers compare to their counterparts
in the benchmark economy. As expected, col+ married men who earn above the earnings
20 Emax in Equation 4 and at all other instances are going to be replaced with in¯nity.
25cap lower their hours signi¯cantly due to a higher marginal tax rate. On average, col+
married men decrease their hours by about 3%. Moreover, women who are married to
col+ men increase their hours by about 1%. As seen from the table, single col+ males
also decrease their labor hours (1.7%). Welfare implications, which are small, are shown in
Panel B of Table 15. Adverse welfare e®ects of higher taxes for high earners are dampened
by the fact that these agents are receiving higher bene¯ts (recall that the cap on bene¯ts
also are eliminated).
Table 15: Economy 4 vs. Benchmark, Cross Sectional E®ects
Panel A
% Change in Hours/Worker
Education of Married Single
Male Male Female Male Female
<hs 0.1 0.4 <hs 0.1 0
hs -0.1 0.2 hs -0.1 0
sc 0 0 sc 0.4 0
col 0 -0.1 col 0 0
col+ -3.0 1.0 col+ -1.7 0
Panel B
% Change In Welfare
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
hs 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
sc 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
col 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1








Note: Entries show cross-sectional implications of eliminating cap on social security taxable
earnings.
4.5 Economy 5: Eliminating All
Finally, I consider an alternative economy where spousal and survivor's bene¯ts, progressive
calculation of bene¯ts and earnings cap are eliminated. A comparison of Economy 5 and
26the benchmark economy is going to give us a picture of the redistribution implied by the
major policies of the current social security. The social security tax rate is 9:8% and the
bene¯ts are calculated with
B(¹ ei) = 0:45¹ ei;
Table 16: Economy 5 vs. Benchmark, Aggregates
% change
Hours per Worker (males) -0.5
Hours per Worker (females) -0.3





Note: Entries show the percentage change in aggregate
variables when all policies considered are eliminated.
As Table 16 shows, female labor force participation is 6.1% higher in Economy 5, whereas
changes in other aggregate variables are less than 1%. Once again, the change in wage rate
is very small.
Table 17 shows the redistribution implied by the four redistributive policies considered
in the paper. Panel A shows that poorer married households (<hs,<hs) get signi¯cantly
lower retirement income, whereas richer households get signi¯cantly higher retirement in-
come. Elimination of the spousal and survivor's provisions results in signi¯cantly higher
married female labor force participation, especially for females with relatively lower levels
of education. Overall, these changes have sizable welfare consequences. Aggregate welfare
increases by 0.6%, while more than 74% of households gain. As Panel C reports, middle-
income married households experience the largest welfare losses (1.1%) from the elimination
of these policies. Poorer households experience a smaller welfare loss (0.6%). Previous
exercises clearly demonstrate why the middle-income married households are the ones who
are most adversely a®ected. The elimination of earnings cap and spousal and survivor's
bene¯ts have larger negative e®ects on these households relative to the poor ones. On the
27Table 17: Economy 5 vs. Benchmark, Cross Sectional E®ects
Panel A
% Change in Bene¯ts
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -20.8 -19.1 -10.5 -1.5 5.2
hs -22.6 -15.6 -5.8 2.3 12.5
sc -16.7 -13.4 -9.0 0.7 11.8
col -9.1 -4.8 -0.6 9.5 17.3
col+ 0.2 5.9 10.4 19.2 25.1
Panel B
% Change in LFP
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs 7.1 9.0 5.2 2.3 3.3
hs 9.8 7.8 7.2 2.4 2.2
sc 7.8 6.1 5.5 3.4 2.4
col 4.3 7.7 6.4 4.4 3.4
col+ 9.6 10 9.1 6.6 4.6
Panel C
% Change In Welfare
Female
Male <hs hs sc col col+
<hs -0.6 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.5
hs -0.6 0.1 1.1 1.1 1.6
sc -0.9 -0.3 0.4 1.2 1.7
col -0.8 0.0 0.5 1.5 2.2








Note: Entries show cross-sectional implications of eliminating all policies considered.
other hand, high earning married households experience a signi¯cant welfare gain (2.1%).
Single rich males experience the largest gains of 3.2%.
5 Conclusions
Quantitative consequences of eliminating the pay-as-you-go system in US has been explored
extensively in the literature. This is the ¯rst that paper studies the quantitative impli-
cations of eliminating (intra-cohort) redistributive policies of social security without elimi-
nating the pay-as-you-go feature of the system using a general equilibrium life-cycle model.
The ¯ndings of the paper have crucial policy implications. Contrary to common percep-
tion, the redistribution currently being done by the system is mostly favoring "traditional"
28single-earner American households. This redistribution is signi¯cantly hurting many single
households and two-earner married households. Moreover, spousal and survivor's bene¯ts
discourage labor force participation for many married females.
As future research, current model can be extended to study the implications of elimi-
nating the-pay-as-you-go system on female labor supply. In Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura
(forthcoming), we ¯nd that changes in income taxes can have signi¯cant e®ects on female
labor force participation. Similarly, the elimination of social security taxes should have
signi¯cant e®ects on female labor supply.
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